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Abstract: Many undesirable activities are controlled by fines imposed by the
government. In some contexts, such as antitrust violations and air pollution,
it makes sense to consider giving the fine to a private party as an inducement
for that party to discover and report the harmful behavior. This paper com-
pares two "pure" forms of private enforcement--competitive and monopolistic--
to public enforcement, allowing for the cost of enforcement to differ among
the methods of enforcement. If the individuals engaging in the undesirable
activity are potentially deterrable, then regardless of relative enforcement
costs, private (competitive or monopolistic) enforcement leads to less enforce-
ment than public enforcement and is socially inferior to public enforcement
if the damage from the activity is sufficiently large. When. private enforce-
ment is cheaper than public enforcement, regulating private enforcers by
paying them something different than the fine for each violator detected can
achieve the socially most preferred outcome in the competitive case but not
in the monopolistic case. If some individuals engaging in the activity are
undeterrable, these results hold if some simple additional conditions are
satisfied. Also, depending on relative enforcement costs, monopolistic en-






Whenever the government attempts to control undesirable behavior it must
choose a sanction to be imposed as well as an agent to do the enforcing. It
is frequently the case that a particular sanction can be enforced within a
va~iety of institutional arrangements. For example, some antitrust penalties
in the United States are enforced both by public agencies--the Justice Depart-
ment and the Federal Trade Commission--and private parties--the victims of
the violations and their lawyers. 1-1/ Simultaneous enforcement by public
agencies and private parties also occurs in the control of air, water and
noise pollution, securities code violations, consumer product safety, and
land use. 1-2/ With a few exceptions (see below), economists have emphasized
the choice of the sanction (e.g., taxes versus standards), taking the enforcer
as given (usually the government). In contrast, this essay focuses on the
choice of the enforcer for a particular type of sanction--a monetary payment
or fine.
The most extensive discussion of the enforcement issue occurred in an
exchange between Becker and Stigler (1974) and Landes and Posner (1975).
Becker and Stigler suggested that private competitive enforcement of fines
--in which the first individual or firm to discover and report the violation
receives the fine--could duplicate the outcome under optimal public enforce-
ment. 1-3/ Landes and Posner, however, claimed that competitive enforcement
would lead unambiguously to too much enforcement relative to optimal public
enforcement. Their intuitive explanation (p. 15) was based on the following
observations. Under public enforcement, if the probability of enforcement is
unity,the fine should be set equal to the external damage caused by the
activity. By raising the fine and lowering the probability, the same level
of deterrence can be achieved at less cost. Under private enforcement, .-2-
however, they argued that raising the fine would lead to a higher probability
since profit-maximizing enforcers would be induced to invest more in enforce-
ment. From this they concluded that there would be private overenforcement.
Landes and Posner also argued that a private monopolist would overenforce for
the same reason, but they concluded that the level of monopolistic enforcement
would be less than in the competitive case (see below for the explanation).
Both Becker and Stigler (1974) and Landes and Posner (1975) assumed in
their analysis that the cost of enforcement (to achieve any given probability)
was the same under competitive, monopolistic, and public enforcement. 1-4/
This assumption precluded welfare comparisons between private and public
enforcement since, at best, the outcome under private enforcement might
duplicate the outcome under optimal public enforcement.
The present paper analyzes the competitive, monopolistic, and public
enforcement of fines allowing for the costs of enforcement to differ by the
choice of the enforcer. There are a number of reasons to expect such differ-
ences. First, the benefits from coordinating enforcement--for example,
avoiding duplication of investigative effort and exploiting economies of
scale in information processing--are obtained under public enforcement and
monopolistic enforcement, but not under competitive enforcement. Second, the
profit motive might be imagined to lead to lower costs under either form of
private enforcement relative to public enforcement. Third, when the revenue
from fines under public enforcement is not sufficient to finance enforcement
costs, there may be a deadweight burden incurred in making up the deficit
from other sources. Conversely, if the fine revenue exceeds enforcement
costs, the effective cost of enforcement would be lower. On balance, these
considerations suggest that monopolistic enforcement may be cheaper than
competitive enforcement, but that public enforcement could be more or less
expensive than private enforcement.-3-
The general conclusions of this essay may be summarized briefly. Regard-
less of relative enforcement costs, private (competitiv~ or monopolistic)
enforcement leads in'~ wide range of circumstances to less enforcement than
public enforcement, rather than more. This result, which tends to occur when
the external damage from the violation is large, is easily explained. Under
private enforcement, firms are willing to invest in enforcement only if they
at least break even--their fine revenue must be at least as large as their
enforcement costs. Under public enforcement, however, the optimal solution
may result in fine revenue which is less than enforcement costs. This is
particularly likely to occur when the damage from the violation is large
since it is then optimal to deter many potential violators. Because the fine
that can be imposed is limited (by the wealth of the potential violators),
successfuldet,errence may require a high probability and correspondingly
large enforcement costs. But successful deterrence and a limited fine may
not generate much fine revenue. Even if private enforcement is less costly
than public enforcement, private firms may not be able to break even at this
level of deterrence and therefore would not be willing to enforce to this
extent.
Public enforcement is socially preferable to private enforcement in many
circumstances even when public enforcement is much costlier. This result
closely parallels the previous one. The circumstances are the same ones
which lead to private underenforcement, and the superiority of public enforce-
ment tends to occur when the external damage from the violation is large.
The explanation for this result is also straightforward. If the damage is
large, it is socially optimal to deter many potential violators. If private
enforcement leads to less enforcement than public enforcement, then public
enforcement is more desirable in this respect. However, public enforcement
may be costlier than private enforcement (for any given probability). But if-4-
the external damage is sufficiently large, the advantages of a higher level
of enforcement will exceed the disadvantages of higher enforcement costs.
Depending on relative enforcement costs, monopolistic enforcement may
result in more or less enforcement than competitive enforcement. If the cost
of enforcement is the same under competitive and monopolistic enforcement,
then, as Landes and Posner (1975) showed, competitive enforcement may be
greater than monopolistic enforcement. The reason is straightforward. Given
a fine, the monopolist chooses a probability which generates (generally)
positive profits. If, initially, competitive enforcement led to the same
probability and profits, additional firms would enter until the profits were
eliminated. The result would be a higher probability. However, because of
the benefits from coordinating enforcement (see above), competitive enforce-
ment may be more expensive than monopolistic enforcement. If competitive
enforcement is sufficiently more expensive, then the level of competitive
enforcement will be less than that of monopolistic enforcement. The high
costs lead the competitive enforcement industry to shrink.
The above results suggest that any of the methods of enforcement may be
socially preferable, depending on the costs of each method as well as on the
magnitude of the external damage. This will be illustrated explicitly through
an example in which enforcement costs are lowest under monopolistic enforce-
ment, higher under competitive enforcement, and highest under public enforce-
ment. In the example, when damages are low, monopolistic enforcement is
socially preferable. Over an intermediate range of damages, competitive
enforcement is most desirable. And for higher damages, public enforcement is
superior.
The previous results assumed that the private enforcers were paid the
fine for each violator caught. The following result, applicable when private
enforcement is cheaper than public enforcement, is also shown. Regulating-5-
private enforc~rs ~ paying them something different than the fine for each
violator detected can achieve the socially most preferred outcome in the
competitive case but not generally in the monopolistic case. The problem in
the monopolistic case is that it may not be possible to eliminate underen-
forcement. The discussion of this result is deferred.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
basic model used to analyze the choice of enforcer. Section 3 discusses
public enforcement. Section 4 presents sufficient conditions for private
(competitive or monopolistic) underenforcement and for the superiority of
pub-lie enforcement. Section 5 compares the levels of competitive and monopo-
listic enforcement. Section 6 contains an example which illustrates the
results of sections 3 through 5 and shows the potential superiority of each
method of enforcement. Section 7 considers public regulation of private
enforcement. Section 8 briefly discusses two generalizations. An appendix
contains proofs of some of the statements in the text.-6-
2. THE MODEL
Individuals are assumed to have the same wealth and to be risk neutral.2-l /
Each individual faces the same probability distribution of private gain from
engaging in an activity which imposes damages on others. For example, every-
one is assumed to be equally likely to need to double park in front of a
hospital as a result of some emergency. (Also, each individual is equally
likely to be the victim of others' damages.) An individual will engage in
the activity if his realized private gain exceeds the expected fine. The
following notation will be used:
y initial wealth
g private gain from engaging in the activity
h(.) probability density of gains
H(.) cumulative distribution of h(.)
g maximum possible gain (minimum is zero)
e external damage
p probability that an individual who engages in
the activity is caught
f fine collected from an individual who engages
in the activity and is caught
The population will be normalized so that total population equals unity.
Thus, given an expected fine pf, [I-H(pf)] individuals will engage in the
activity.
The cost of catching violators is assumed to depend on the fraction
caught and on an exogenous shift parameter, A ~ 1, which will be used to
represent differences in enforcement costs:2-2/c(p, A)
-7-
cost of catching fraction p of individuals who
engage in the activity (oc/op > 0, OC/OA > 0,
and lim c(p, A) = ~ for all p > 0)
A-?OO
In the competitive case, this cost function measures the aggregate cost for
the industry, not the cost for each firm. The relevant values of the shiEt
parameter under public, competitive, and monopolistic enforcement will be ~,
Since everyone is identical (ex ante) and risk neutral, social welfare,
W, equals the expected private gain from engaging in the activity, less the
expected damage imposed, and less the cost of enforcement. It will be useful




W(p, f, A) = !gh(g)dg - [l-H(pf)]e - c(p, A).
pf
Under public enforcement, the public enforcement agency's (hereafter the
"agency") problem is to choose the probability and fine so as to maximize
social welfare. Under monopolistic and competitive enforcement, the agency
still chooses the fine to maximize social welfare, but the probability is
2-3/ determined by the private sector.--- In the monopolistic case the proba-
bility is implicitly determined by profit maximization (provided that profits
are nonnegative), and in the competitive case by the condition that (in the
long run) profits are zero. For given p and f, profits equal fine revenue,
pf[l-H(pf)], less enforcement costs, c. In all three cases, the fine is
d b b d d b h 1 h f
0 dO °d 1 2-4/ assume to e oun e y t e wea t 0 1n 1V1 ua s, y.---
facing the agency may be stated in the following way.
The three problems-8-
Public enforcement:
(2.2) MAX W(p, f, ~).
p,f




(2.4) pf[l-H(pf)] - c(p, A C) = O.






MAX W(p, f, ~)
f
MAX pf[l-H(pf)] - c(p, ~).
p
The corresponding values of p and f will be PM and fM. (Assuming c(O, A) =0,
(2.6) incorporates the constraint that profits are nonnegative since the
monopolist is free to choose p =0.)
This description of competitive and monopolistic enforcement assumes
that private enforcers receive the fine when they have detected a violator.
The feasibility and desirability of compensating private enforcers in other
ways is discussed in section 7.-9-
3. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT
In this section the relevant features of public enforcement will be
developed. After deriving the optimal fine and probability, the way in which
the probability varies with the external damage will be discussed.
It is well known from the work of Becker (1968) and others that if
individuals are risk neutral, the optimal fine equals their wealth. This
result is easy to show in the present model. Suppose, to the contrary, that
f* < y. Let k =p*f* be the expected fine. By raising f* to y and lowering
p* to k/y, the expected fine is maintained at k. Since individuals' deci-
sions whether to engage in the activity are unaffected, the first two terms
in the social welfare function (2.l)--private gains and external damages--are
unaffected. The third term, enforcement costs, is reduced since the proba-
bility of catching violators has fallen. Note that the optimality of the
fine equal to individuals' wealth does not depend on the magnitude of the
external damage e.
Given f* =y, the optimal probability is determined implicitly by the
first order condition with respect to the probability (assuming a unique
interior maximum); after some manipulation this may be written as
(3.1) oH oc
[e - PY]op = op'
This condition has a natural interpretation. As the'probability is raised
marginally, enforcement costs rise by ocjop. However, fewer individuals en-
gage in the activity since the expected fine has risen; this effect is repre-
sented by oHjop. Each individual who does not now engage in the activity
reduces external costs by e but forgoes private gains of py. Since ocjop > 0
and oHjop > 0, it must be that e > py for (3.1) to be satisfied; in other-10-
words, at the optimum there is a net benefit to society from each individual
who is induced not to engage in the activity. Thus, (3.1) states that the
marginal benefits of further deterrence from raising the probability just
equal the marginal costs of raising the probability.
Since the optimal fine equals individual wealth regardless of the ex-
ternal damage, e, one would expect that an increase in e would lead to a





where "SOC" refers to the second order condition, which is negative.
As the external damage approaches zero, the optimal probability ap-
proaches zero:
(3.3) lim pi'(e) = O.
e-70
Although a proof of (3.3) is contained in the appendix, the result is intu-
itively plausible. The maximum possible benefit from deterrence is e (at
most everyone violates the rule). Since it is never worth spending more on
enforcement than the benefits from deterrence, spending must approach zero as
e approaches zero. This implies that the optimal probability must approach
zero.
As the external cost approaches infinity, the optimal probability ap~
proaches an upper bound:
(3.4) lim p*(e) = min[g/y, 1].
e700
The proof of (3.4) is contained in the appendix. The intuition is as fol-
lows.3- l / If the maximum possible gain, g, is less than (or equal to) indi-
viduals' wealth, y, then everyone is potentially deterrable (that is, could-11-
be deterred by some p ~ 1 and some f ~ y).3-2/ If the external damage they
impose is sufficiently large, then it becomes worthwhile to deter everyone.
To do so, the expected fine, p*y, must equal g; that is, p* =g/y. Any
higher p creates unnecessary costs. If g is greater than y, then individuals
whose gains exceed yare undeterrable. But, if e is sufficiently large, it
becomes worthwhile to deter everyone else; to do so, p* must equal 1. In
brief, (3.4) states that as the external damage approaches infinity, it
becomes worthwhile to do everything possible to deter individuals from violat-
ing the rule.
None of the above results depends on the level of the enforcement cost
shift parameter ~.However, the level of ~ obviously affects the probability
which is optimal for any external damage e. It is easy to show that
(3.5) ~*
dA = < 0,
assuming a2C/apaA > O. In other words, the optimal probability falls at each
level of the external damage when the schedule of enforcement costs rises,
provided that marginal enforcement costs also rise.-12-
4. PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT
This section explains sufficient conditions for two results. The first
is that the expected fine under private enforcement, pOfo, is less than the
expected fine under public enforcement, p*f*. The second is that social
welfare is higher under public enforcement even though the cost of enforce-
ment (for any probability) may be much higher under public enforcement. Both
of these results occur when the external damage is "large." The comparison
of private and public enforcement when the external damage is small will be
discussed in the context of an example in section 6.
Proposition 1: Regardless of how the public agency chooses the fine
under private enforcement, regardless of whether the private enforcement
industry is competitive or monopolistic, and regardless of the relative costs
of private and public enforcement, there will be private underenforcement
(pOfO < p~"'f*) for sufficiently large external damages (e) if
(i) all individuals who engage in the activity are potentially deter-
rable (g ~ y), or if
(ii) there are some undeterrable individuals (g > y) and anyone of the
following conditions holds:
(a) the number of undeterrable individuals (l-H(y)) is suffi-
ciently small,
(b) the wealth of individuals (y) is sufficiently small,
(c) the cost of enforcement approaches infinity as the probability
approaches unity (lim c(p, 1) = 00).
p-71
The proof of Proposition I is presented in the appendix. The basic idea
behind the proof is relatively simple. Suppose first that all individuals
are potentially deterrable, that is g ~ y. In this case the expected fine-13-
under optimal public enforcement approaches complete deterrence, g, as the
external cost, e, approaches infinity: f* =Y and p* approaches g/y. If the
expected fine under private enforcement, pOfo, were to· approach complete
deterrence, fine revenue would approach zero. Since enforcement costs are
positive for any positive p, profits would be negative. Thus, pOfo must be
less than g, so there exists some e beyond which pOfo < p*f*. When there are
some undeterrable individuals, that is g > y, this argument does not apply
directly because there will always be some fine revenue under private enforce-
ment. In this case the expected fine under public enforcement approaches
maximum possible deterrence as e approaches infinity: f* =y and p* approaches
1. For the expected fine under private enforcement to approach maximum
possible deterrence, po would have to approach 1. Anyone of the three
additional conditions is sufficient to imply negative profits when po is in
the neighborhood of 1, regardless of fO (~y). The conditions with respect
to the number of undeterrable individuals, [l-H(y)], and their wealth, y,
lead to negative profits by making fine revenue sufficiently small, while the
last condition implies negative profits by making enforcement costs suffi-
ciently large. Thus, po must be bounded away from 1 for all e, so there
again exists some e beyond which pOfo < p*f*.
Put another way, the basic point of Proposition 1 is the following.
Under private enforcement, the only feasible combinations of the probability
and the fine are those which result in fine revenue at least as large as
enforcement costs. But when the external damage is high, the optimal proba-
bility and fine under public enforcement are both high; this implies low fine
revenue--because of successful deterrence--and large enforcement costs. The
high probability and fine may not be compatible with private enforcement,
even if private enforcement is less costly than public enforcement. Hence,
private underenforcement.4-l /-14-
Proposition~: Regardless of how the public agency chooses the fine
under priv~te enforcement, regardless of whether the private enforcement
industry is competitive or monopolistic, and regardless of how much costlier
public enforcement is than private enforcement (for any Ap < (0), public
enforcement is socially preferable to private enforcement for sufficiently
large external damages if any of the conditions stated in Proposition 1 hold.
The proof of Proposition 2 is also contained in the appendix. The
intuition behind the proof is easily explained. If any of the conditions of
Proposition 1 are satisfied, there exists some level of the external damage
beyond which pOfo < p*f*. The higher level of public enforcement has three
consequences for social welfare (2.1). First, the private gains from engag-
ing in the activity are reduced because more potential violators are deterred.
Second, the external damages are reduced for the same reason. Third, enforce-
ment costs may be higher because p* may exceed po, and ~ may exceed both AC
and~. The first and the third effects, which reduce social welfare, can
have only a limited impact since at most everyone is deterred and the cost of
enforcement is finite for p < 1 and A < 00. The second effect, which improves
social welfare, has an unlimited impact as the external damage increases.
Thus, public enforcement will lead to higher social welfare if the damage is
sufficiently large.-15-
5. COMPETITIVE VERSUS MONOPOLISTIC ENFORCEMENT
This section states a sufficient condition for the result that the
expected fine under competitive enforcement, Pefe' is lower than the expected
fine under monopolistic enforcement, PMfM. This result occurs when the cost
of competitive enforcement is "large" relative to that of monopolistic enforce-
ment. The relationship between competitive and monopolistic enforcement when
enforcement costs are similar will be described in the context of an example
in the next section.
Proposition 2: Regardless of how the public agency chooses the fine
under private enforcement and regardless of how costly monopolistic enforce-
ment is (for any ~ < ~), competitive enforcement will be less than monopo-
listic enforcement (Pefe < PMfM) if competitive enforcement is sufficiently
costly (Ae sufficiently large).
The proof, which is included in the appendix, is based on the following
reasoning. If Pefe is at least as large as PMfM' then PC must be at least as
large as some positive probability (PMfM/y , otherwise Pefe ~ PeY < PMfM).
Even at this probability, competitive enforcement costs grow without bound as
A e increases. Since there is only a finite amount of fine revenue that can
possibly be raised, profits in the competitive enforcement industry must
become negative for Ae sufficiently large. This implies that Pefe must be
below PMfM if Ae is large enough.
Obviously, if Ae is very large, it may be preferable for the public
agency to choose fe = 0 because competitive enforcement is not worth its
costs at any level of enforcement. This is not why Pefe < PMfM when Ae is
large. An example is presented in the next section in which 0 < Pefe < PMfM
over a range of Ae , when both fe and fMare chosen by the public agency to
maximize social welfare.-16-
6. AN EXAMPLE
In this section an analytically solvable example of the complete model
will be described. Besides illustrating the results of the previous three
sections it will show how the public agency sets the fine under private
enforcement, and how the potential superiority of each method of enforcement
depends on the relative costs of enforcement and the magnitude of the external
damage.
The example is characterized by two assumptions. First, the probability
density of private gains is uniform:
(6.1) h(g) =constant =l/g.
Second, enforcement costs are proportional to the probability of catching
violators and to the enforcement cost shift parameter:
(6.2) c(p, A) =Akp,
where A ~ 1 and k is the cost per unit of probability when A=1.
Given these assumptions, social welfare (2.1) becomes:
(6.3) W(p, f, A) = [~- p:n - [1 -;} - Akp.
The first term (in brackets) represents expected private gains, the second
expected external damages, and the third enforcement costs.










e* < e ~ e* + min[g, y],
e > e* + min[g, y],-17-
(6.5) e'" - " -
There are three regions in terms of the external damage, e. For e
sufficiently small, it is not worthwhile controlling the activity at all
since the benefits--Iower damages--are less than the costs--enforcement costs
and foregone private gains. For intermediate e the optimal probability is
positive and increasing with e. Depending on whether g 5 y, it increases to
I or g/y at some e and remains there for all higher e.
Monopolistic enforcement. The monopolist's profit function is:
(6.6) TI(p, f) =
The monopolist's profit maximizing choice of p, given f, is:
(6.7) = for f ~ Ak.




0, 0, e S eM'
fM = PM =
(y - Ak)g y, , e > eM' 2y2
eM = (3Ak + y)g/4y.
(When fM=y, the monopolist's profits are strictly positive.)
There are two regions in terms of the external damage. For e suf-
ficiently small, it is not worth controlling the activity, so the public
agency sets the fine at zero. For larger e, it is worth controlling the
activity. In this example the optimal fine under monopolistic enforcement
jumps from zero to y.6-2/
Competitive enforcement. The competitive industry's aggregate profits
must equal zero in equilibrium. Thus,(6.10)




(6.11) = for f ~ Ak.
Substituting (6.11) into (6.3) and maximizing over f leads to:
I o. r'
e ~ ee'
(6.12) fC = Pe =
y, (y - Ak)g e > ee' ,
y2
where
(6.13) e - (Ak + y)g/2y. e -
The discussion following (6.9) applies here as well.
The public, monopolistic, and competitive enforcement results are sum-
marized in Figure 1. The solid lines show in each case how the expected fine
varies with the level of external damages assuming that enforcement costs are
at their minimum, A =1. Each of the schedules would shift, of course, if A
were higher. The dashed line labeled "c-locus" is the locus of starting
points (ee) and levels (Pefe) for competitive enforcement defined by the
feasible range of A > 1. For example, the competitive schedule when A = 3 is
illustrated. The "m-locus" is defined similarly for monopolistic enforcement.
Under public enforcement, the expected fine schedule would shift to the right
in a parallel way as A increases. Figure 1 is constructed on the assumptions
that g =y, so all individuals are potentially deterrable, and that k = .25y,
that is, one-quarter of society's income would be required to catch everyone
when A=1. None of the important qualitative results in Figure 1 depend on
these assumptions.
Figure 1 illustrates the result of Proposition 1 concerning private
underenforcement. Since everyone is potentially deterrable, condition (i) of-19-
Proposition 1 applies--a high enough external damage is sufficient to guaran-
tee private underenforcement. Figure 1 shows that the minimum level of e
required before underenforcement is observed may be different under competi-
tive and monopolistic enforcement. Figure 1 also shows that the level of
private enforcement may exceed that of public enforcement when damages are
low. For example, when A = 1 for each method of enforcement, there is a
region of overenforcement for both competitive and monopolistic enforcement.
However, depending on relative enforcement costs, there may be no external
damage at which private overenforcement occurs. Compare for example, the
competitive schedule in Figure 1 when A=3 to the public schedule when
A = 1.
The intuitive explanation of private underenforcement (see sections 1
and 4) suggested that private underenforcement tends to occur when it is
optimal under public enforcement to deter "many" or "most" potential violators
(since fine revenue is then likely to be less than enforcement costs).
However, Figure 1 indicates indirectly that private underenforcement can
occur even when most potential violators are not deterred. For example,
suppose A= 1 for both monopolistic and public enforcement. At the external
damage at which PMfM first becomes less than p*f* (this occurs, coinciden-
tally, at eC in Figure 1), p*f* = .375y. Since private gains are uniform
between 0 and g =y, this implies that even when it is optimal under public
enforcement to deter as few as 38% of the potential violators, monopolistic
enforcement is less than public enforcement. If monopolistic enforcement is
costlier than public enforcement, then this underenforcement result can occur
at an even lower level of public deterrence.
Figure 1 also illustrates the result of Proposition 3 that competitive






















ment is sufficiently more expensive. For example, if A = 1 for monopolistic
enforcement and A = 3 for competitive enforcement, this result is shown ex-
plicitly. However, there are many combinations of ~ and AC which also lead
to this result. From (6.8) and (6.12) it is easy to show that the expected
fine under competitive enforcement will be less than the expected fine under
monopolistic enforcement if 2AC - ~ > yjk. Since Figure 1 was constructed
on the assumption that k = .25y, yjk = 4 in this case. That competitive
enforcement may exceed monopolistic enforcement is also shown in Figure 1
when AC =~ = 1.
An example of welfare comparisons among public, competitive, and monopo-
listic enforcement is illustrated in Figure 2. It is assumed that monopolis-
tic enforcement is least expensive (A =1), competitive enforcement is more
I
costly (A =1.5), and public enforcement is most expensive (A =2). The
corresponding expected fine schedules are shown in Figure 2. A fourth expected
fine schedule, labeled "first-best (A =1)," is included as a benchmark; this
is the schedule that would have been derived under public enforcement if
public enforcement were as cheap as possible (A =1). The darkened portion
of each schedule indicates the range over which it is the socially preferred
method of enforcement. When damages are very low (below eM in Figure 2),
violations are not worth controlling at all. As damages increase, monopolis-
tic enforcement then becomes preferable because it is cheapest and "reasonably"
close to first-best enforcement. For even higher damages, competitive enforce-
ment is best because it is then closer to first-best enforcement than monopo-
listic enforcement is, and it is still cheaper than public enforcement.
I
Finally, for sufficiently high damages, public enforcement becomes preferable
despite its costs because it leads to the highest level of enforcement,
coinciding with the level of first-best enforcement.FIGURE 2
'- competitive (:\=1. 5)
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external damage, e-21-
Thus, Figure 2 illustrates the result of Proposition 2 concerning the
superiority of public enforcement. Since everyone is potentially deterrable
in the example, a high enough external damage is sufficient to guarantee this
result.
Public enforcement may also be socially preferable at low levels of
damages even when public enforcement is costlier than private enforcement.
For example, suppose A = 1 for monopolistic enforcement and A = 1 + e for
public enforcement, where e > 0 may be arbitrarily small. At the level of
external damages eM in Figure 2, social welfare under monopolistic enforce-
ment is the same as when the activity is not controlled at all (by construc-
tion of eM)' and strictly less than social welfare under first-best enforce-
ment (since it is desirable to begin using first-best enforcement at a lower
level of damages). But as e approaches zero, social welfare under public
enforcement approaches social welfare under first-best enforcement. Thus,
for e sufficiently small, public enforcement will be socially preferable to
monopolistic enforcement for external damages just above eM in Figure 2.
This does not imply that public enforcement is more desirable at all higher
levels of the external damage. To the contrary, at the level of the external
damage in Figure 2 where the monopolistic schedule crosses the first-best
schedule, monopolistic enforcement.is socially preferable. It duplicates the
first-best outcome, whereas public enforcement is costlier since A > 1 (as a
result ,of the higher costs, the level of public enforcement would be lower).
By Proposition 2, however, public enforcement eventually becomes preferable
again for sufficiently high external damages. Thus, the optimal choice of
enforcer may depend in a complicated way on relative enforcement costs and
the level of the external damage.-22-
7. PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
When public enforcement is more expensive than private enforcement, it
is natural to ask whether some form of public regulation of private enforce-
ment can achieve the first-best outcome--what the public enforcement agency
would choose if it could enforce as cheaply as the private enforcers. It is
obvious that this outcome can be reached in principle if the agency appropri-
ately compensates private enforcers on the basis of the probability of detect-
ing violators or, equivalently, the number of violators deterred. However,
it may be very expensive or impossible for the agency to verify claims by
private enforcers that they had achieved a high probability and thereby
deterred a large number of individuals. This would certainly be true in the
context of activities which can be concealed like securities fraud or price
fixing (but may not be true in other contexts like pollution).7-l/ Since
this difficulty does not arise if the compensation is based on the number of
violators actually caught, an interesting question is whether there exists
some compensation schedule based on this information which can achieve the
first-best outcome. When the compensation schedule takes the simple form of
paying private enforcers a fixed amount per person caught, this amount will
be referred to as a bounty, b.
Proposition~: Under competitive enforcement, there exists a bounty
which can achieve (or come arbitrarily close to) the first-best outcome.
The proof of this result is straightforward. To achieve the first-best
outcome the public agency must choose f =Y (for the reason discussed in
section 3). Given f = Y and a bounty b, the zero profit condition for the
competitive industry is
(7.1) n = pb[l-H(py)] - c(p, A) = O.
Solving (7.1) for b leads to(7.2)
-23-
b(p) = c(p, A)/p[l-H(py)].
This determines a finite bounty for every p > 0 provided that enforcement
costs, c, are not infinite and that the number of individuals engaging in the
activity, [l-H(py)], is not zero. For enforcement costs to be infinite or
the number of violators to be zero, He optimal probability would have to be
at its upper bound, P=min[g/y, 1]. In this case, a probability can be
achieved under competitive enforcement which is arbitrarily close to the
optima1 probability. The remaining detail in the proof is to show that there
does not exist more than one probability which satisfies the zero profit
condition for the same bounty. Intuitively, one would expect that the higher
the probability desired, the higher the bounty required, so this should not
be a problem. This detail is left to the appendix.
Proposition~: Under monopolistic enforcement, there does not exist a
bounty which can correct (even approximately) for underenforcement if all
individuals are potentially deterrable (g ~ y) or if the number of undeter-
rable individuals (l-H(y)) is sufficiently small.
The proof of this proposition is contained in the appendix. To under-
stand the basic idea behind this result, suppose the monopolist maximizes
just bounty revenue, pb[l-H(py)], rather than revenue minus enforcement
costs. This is equivalent, of course, to maximizing the number of violators
caught, p[l-H(py)], regardless of the bounty b. If all individuals are
potentially deterrable and the probability were at the level which deterred
everyone, obviously no individuals would be caught. Thus, no matter how
large the bounty is, it would pay the monopolist to choose a lower probabil-
ity than this one. Taking enforcement costs into account tends to lower the
profit maximizing probability even further. Since the optimal probability
approaches the probability which deters everyone as the external damage-24-
approaches infinity (3.4), there will be monopolistic underenforcement which
cannot be corrected by any bounty. If there are some undeterrable individuals,
the same reasoning applies as long as the monopolist would iricrease the
number of violators caught by lowering the probability from unity. If the
number of undeterrable individuals is sufficiently small, then lowering the
probability will have this effect--the reduction in the number of undeterrable
individuals caught will be offset by the increase in the number of potentially
deterrable individuals caught.
Proposition 5 can be illustrated in terms of the example in the previous
section. Assuming, as there, that g=y and k = .25y, and given fM=y, it
is easy to show that the monopolist's profit maximizing probability is PM =
.5 - (y/.125b). Thus, although PM is increasing with b, as b approaches
infinity, PM only approaches .5.
The reason for the success of a bounty in the competitive case and its
failure in the monopolistic case is not entirely surprising. In both cases,
a higher bounty induces a higher probability.7-2/ The higher probability in
turn reduces the number of individuals engaging in the activity. While each
competitive firm treats the number of individuals engaging in the activity as
fixed, the monopolist takes the actual reduction into account. When the
probability becomes high enough, this effect may become severe enough to put
a ceiling on the probability that the monopolist is willing to choose.
In general, the amount of compensation can be any function of the number
of violators caught. It may seem that limiting the function to the special
case of a fixed payment per person caught is what prevents the first-best
outcome from being achieved under monopolistic enforcement. The following
proposition shows that this is not the case.
Proposition~: Under monopolistic enforcement, there does not exist any
schedule of compensation based on the number of violators caught which can-25-
correct for underenforcement if either of the conditions stated in Proposi-
tion 5 holds.
The proof of this proposition is outlined here. Let n(p) =p[l-H(py)]
be the number of violators actually caught, and let p > 0 be the probability
at which n(.) reaches its maximum (if there is more than one such probability,
let p be the smallest). The discussion folloWing Proposition 5 indicated
that if either of the conditions stated there holds, a reduction in the
probability from the upper bound probability, p=min[g/y, 1], increases the
number of persons caught; that is n I (p) < o. Thus, P < p. Since n(.) is
continuous (assuming h(.) is continuous) and nCO) = 0, for every probability
between p and p there exists a probability between 0 and p which leads to the
same number of violators caught. As a result, no probability between p and p
can be achieved--the monopolist would always choose the corresponding probabil-
ity below p since it would lead to the same compensation and lower enforcement
costs (if there is more than one such probability below p, the monopolist
will choose the lower of these).
There is a potential difficulty with regulating private enforcers by
paying them something different than the fine which has not been incorporated
into the above analysis. If private enforcers are taxed (a bounty less than
the fine), then, as Landes and Posner (1975, p. 24) have suggested, "... both
the apprehended offenders and the enforcer would be better off privately
negotiating a payment that was less than the statutory fine but greater than
the fine minus the tax." If private enforcers are paid more than the fine,
there would be an incentive to fabricate offenses. These considerations do
not necessarily imply, however, that this form of regulation cannot still
improve matters over unregulated private enforcement. (Moreover, as Becker
and Stigler (1975) have forcefully argued, analogous problems of malfeasance
may arise under public enforcement.)-26-
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are two ways in which the present model can be made more realistic
without affecting the basic results. If the individuals being controlled are
risk averse rather than risk neutral, then, a~ Polinsky a~d Shavell (forthcom-
ing) have shown, the optimal fine under public enforcement is generally less
than individuals' wealth and the optimal probability is generally higher than
it would be if they were risk neutral. However, it still appears to be true
that if the external damage is high enough, it is optimal under public enforce-
8-1/ ment to deter as many individuals as possible, possibly everyone.--- Then,
for the reasons discussed in this paper, (unregulated) private enforcement
may lead to underenforcement, and public enforcement would therefore be
superior if the external damage is large enough. The result concerning the
comparison of competitive and monopolistic enforcement and those concerning
public regulation of private enforcement are essentially unaffected.
The second way to make the model more realistic would be to include the
number of violators in the enforcement cost function as well as the probabil-
ity of catching them. Enforcement costs would increase, .everything else
equal, if the probability rises or if the number of violators rises. Then,
raising the probability might reduce costs since the number of individuals
engaging in the activity would fall. However, it seems plausible to assume
that some costs must be incurred to set a high probability even if, as a
result of that probability, no one actually engages in the activity. In
other words, to achieve complete deterrence (if that is possible) some "stand-
by" costs must be incurred (for example, policemen on street corners). Then,
again for the reasons discussed here, (unregulated) private enforcers may not
be willing to enforce to the same extent as public enforcers and public
enforcement will be preferable if the damages are sufficiently large. The
other results are essentially unchanged or can be reformulated.A-I
APPENDIX
Assumptions used in some proofs are carried over to others without
restating them. Also, c(p, A) is written simply as c(p) where this does not
lead to confusion.
If lim p*(e) is not zero, there exists a sequence e. ~ D
e~D 1
such that p*(e.) ~ e for some e > D and all i. This leads to a contradiction.
1
Let W(.) be social welfare as a function of p. It is easy to show that if
e = ei'
W(D) - W(p"\-) =/
D
gh(g)dg - H(p*y)e. + c(p*)
1
ey
> / gh(g)dg - ei ,
D
which is positive for sufficiently small ei , contradicting the presumed
optimality of p*(e.).
1
Proof of (3.4): It is assumed that c(p) < 00 for all p < p, where
p =min[g/y, 1]. For the reason noted in section 3, p* ~ g/y when g < y.
Thus, if lim p*(e) is not p, there exists a sequence e. ~ 00 such that
1
e~
p*(e.) ~ p - e for some e > D and all i. This leads to a contradiction. Let
1
p be any probability satisfying p - e < p < p. It is straightforward to show
that if e =ei'




gh(g)dg + [H(py)-H(p*y)]e. - [cCp)-c(p*)]
1
> -g + [H(py)-H«p-e)y)]e. - c(p),
1A-2
which is positive for sufficiently large e., contradicting the presumed opti-
1
Note that this argument does not depend on any assumption






proved: there exists an e < 00 such that for all e > e, p* =min[g/y, 1].
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof will refer to the monopolist, although
it applies directly to the competitive case as well. Regardless of how the
public agency chooses the fine under monopolistic enforcement, let po and fO
be any equilibrium probability and fine combination. The resulting profits
to the monopolist are
Let zbe the expected fine pOfo. If fO < y, raise the fine to y and lower
the probability to z/y, so that the expected fine is constant. Since revenue
would be constant and enforcement costs would be lower, the monopolist's
profits would be higher. Thus, for any equilibrium expected fine z, the
monopolist's profits are less than or equal to
n(z) = z[l-H(z)] - c(z/y).
First case: g ~ y. Since lim p*(e) =min[g/y, 1] and f* =y, the
e-+OO
expected fine under optimal public enforcement approaches g. At this ex-
pected fine the monopolist's profits are less than or equal to
neg) = -c(g/y) < o.
By the continuity of n, there exists a 6 > 0 such that n(z) < 0 for all z satis-
fying g - 6 < z ~ g. Thus, pOfo ~ g - 6 and, given a sufficiently large e,
p~"'f~\- > g- 6.
Second case: g > y. The expected fine under public enforcement ap-
proaches y. At this expected fine the monopolist's profits are less than or
equal toA-3
n(y) = y[l-H(y)] - c(l).
If [l-H(y)] or yare sufficiently small, or if lim c(p) = 00, n(y) will be
p-71
negative. Assuming n(y) is negative, the previous argument implies pOfo < p*f*
for sufficiently large e.
Proof of Proposition 2: If any of the conditions stated in Proposition 1
hold, then (from the proof of that proposition) there exists a 6 > 0 such
that pOfo ~ py - 6 for all e, where p =min[g/y, 1]. Let p be any probability
A
satisfying py - 6 < py < py, and let W(.) be social welfare as a function of
e assuming p =p, f =y, and A = ~ < 00. Also, let WO(.) be social welfare
under private enforcement assuming A=AO <~. It is straightforward to
show that
Wee) - WO(e) =
A py
-~ gh(g)dg + [H(py)-H(pOfO)]e - [c(p, ~)-c(pO, AO)]
pOfo
> -g + [H(py)-H(py-6)]e - c(p, ~),
which is positive for sufficiently large e. Since social welfare under
public enforcement is at least as large as Wee) (p may not equal p*(e)), the
result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3: Fix ~ < 00. Suppose PCfC ~ PMfM > 0 for all
AC· Then PC ~ PMfM/y > 0 for all AC. This leads to a contradiction. Compet-
itive profits are
<
which is negative for sufficiently large AC' contradicting the zero profit
condition. Thus, PCfC < PMfM for large enough AC.A-4
Proof of Proposition~: It remains to be shown that db/dp > O. From
(7.2), wri~ing oc/op as c',
sign(dbjdp) = sign{c'p[l-H] c([l-H] - phy)}.
It is assumed that the profit function n is strictly concave in p. This
implies that at the p > 0 where profits are zero,
on/op = b[l-H] - bphy - c' < O.
Using this result,
c'p[l-H] - c([l-H] - phy) > c'p[l-H] - c(c'/b)
= c'(p[l-H] - (c/b)) = 0,
where the last equality follows from the zero profit condition. Thus, db/dp > O.
Proof of Proposition ~: Setting f =Y and the bounty at b, the monopolist's
profits are
n(p) = pb[l-H(py)] - c(p).
Let p =min[g/y, 1] and assume that c'(p) < 00 (the result will clearly also
hold if c'(p) =00). It is sufficient to show that
c' (p) < -c' (p)
regardless of b, since this implies PM < P - £ for some £ > o. If g ~ y,
[l-H(py)] = [l-H(g)] =0, so n' (p) < -c' (p). If g > y, n' (p) < -c' (p) if
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1-1/ See, for example, Elzinga and Breit (1976). A similar policy has
recently been adopted in Canada. See Prichard and Trebilcock (1978). In the
antitrust context, as in many other contexts (see note 1-2 below), it is
usually not the exact same sanction which is enforced both privately and
publicly, but rather, close substitutes. For example, the Justice Department
can seek to impose a fine on an antitrust violator, whereas a private party
can seek "treble damages."
1-2/ See, for example, Clark (forthcoming), Ellickson (1973), and
Mashaw (1975). See also Dam (1975).
1-3/ Because of other considerations (public malfeasance), Becker and
Stigler suggested a preference for private enforcement. From a somewhat
different perspective, their discussion of private enforcement has been
formalized and supported by Harris and Raviv (1978).
1-4/ This assumption was implicit in Becker and Stigler's discussion and
explicit in Landes and Posner's model (p. 10). Landes and Posner did discuss
informally (pp. 29-30) why enforcement costs might differ.
2-1/ Risk neutrality was also assumed by Becker and Stigler (1974) and
Landes and Posner (1975). The present results would not be affected if in-N-2
dividuals were risk averse; see section 8.
2-2/ In general, the cost also depends on the number of violators.
This effect is omitted since it is not central to the present argument. All
of the main results carryover to the more general case; see section 8.
2-3/ It is assumed that an equilibrium exists and is unique for each
fine under private enforcement.
2-4/ It may not be possible to increase the maximum fine by including
the private gain g. The gain may be concealed if it is money ("Swiss bank
account"), or it may be nonmonetary (tlsaving your spouse's life by speeding
to a hospitaltl).
3-1/ The intuitive explanation presumes that enforcement costs are
finite for all probabilities. This leads to a stronger statement than (3.4);
see the appendix.
3-2/ Individuals for whom g =yare indifferent between engaging and
not engaging in the activity when p =1 and f =y. Since nothing is affected,
it is assumed that they would choose not to engage in the activity.
4-1/ In response to an earlier version of this paper, William Landes and
Richard Posner discovered that the possibility of private underenforcement
was implicit in their (1975) analysis. They now maintain that an additional
assumption is necessary in order to guarantee their private overenforcement
result. The assumption is that the wealth of injurers is not a binding
constraint on the choice of the fine under private enforcement. But this
assumption is not likely to be satisfied when the external damage is "large"
since the enforcement agency would probably wish to choose a high fine in
order to achieve a high level of deterrence.
6-1/ In describing the results for the three methods of enforcement, the
subscripts with respect to A are omitted for notational simplicity.N-3
6-2/ In general the optimal fine probably would rise continuously as
the external damage increases.
7-1/ Since it is assumed in the model that potential violators know the
probability of being detected by private enforcers, it may seem peculiar to
assume that the public enforcement agency may not be able to determine this
probability. However, a more realistic assumption is that neither potential
violators nor the enforcement agency are able to estimate with much accuracy
the true probability under private enforcement. The agency may not wish to
compensate private enforcers on the basis of such imperfect information. As
long as potential violators perceive a higher probability when the true prob-
ability has risen, the basic features of the present analysis would not be
affected.
7-2/ In the competitive case, this is shown in the proof of Proposition
4 in the appendix. In the monopolistic case, it is easy to show that dp/db =
-[l-H]/[SOC] > o.
8-1/ Suppose everyone is potentially deterrable. As the damage goes to
infinity, if everyone is deterred, no one would bear any risk. If there are
some undeterrable individuals, their bearing of risk must be taken into
account. However, as the damage goes to infinity, if the probability ap-
proaches unity and the fine approaches wealth, the risk bearing would dis-
appear. Thus, it seems in both cases that the optimal solution as the damage
approaches infinity is not affected by risk aversion.R-l
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